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Abstract:  
This paper revisits academic commentary on the English Riots, 2011, as an entry point for re-
imagining the political agency of the digital camera, and advancing a new materialist reading of 
the politics and practices of witnessing. Via Bennett’s (2010) exposition of the “vital materialism” 
of “thing-power,” two key problematics are explored: firstly, what counts as political agency in sites 
of riot, protest and violent disorder; and secondly, who, and importantly, what can and does act 
politically? What sense can be made of practices of witnessing - of bearing witness to riot - when 
agentic capacity is granted to nonhuman actants; and what happens to the politics of witnessing 
when “vibrant matter” is invested with political capabilities? In responding to these questions, the 
paper takes critical stock of the (immediate) aftermath of the English Riots, where practices of 
witnessing are entangled with, and co-opted into police investigative work. It is in this context that 
the “thing-power” of digital camera technologies stages a series of ethico-political interventions, 
and signals an alternative political imaginary in which heterogeneous assemblages of human and 
nonhuman actants mobilise an ecology of political practices predicated on witnessing, 
surveillance, investigation, vigilance, and the visual archive.   
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_____________________________________ 
Introduction: witnessing riot 
Collectively dubbed as the English Riots, Bridges notes that “(f)or four days in August 2011, 
England experienced probably the most widespread public disorders in its history” (2012: 1). 
Ignited by the “flashpoint incident” (Waddington 2012) of the shooting of Mark Duggan in a 
contentious police operation, a peaceful protest outside a Tottenham police station quickly erupted 
into convulsive disorder, with riots, looting, arson, and violent affray spreading in a matter of days 
to twenty-two of London’s thirty-two boroughs, and sixty-six other local authority and police force 
areas across the country, including Merseyside, Greater Manchester, Hertfordshire, Avon and 
Somerset, the West Midlands and West Yorkshire (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
2011; Metropolitan Police Service 2012a). The riots cost British taxpayers £133 million (Lavelle 
2011), with a further £200 million paid out by insurers; approximately 2500 shops were looted 
(Topping and Bawdon 2011). The riots involved an estimated 13,000 to 15,000 individuals, and 
more than 5000 crimes were committed, including 1860 incidents of arson and criminal damage, 
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1649 burglaries, and 366 attacks on people (Association of British Insurers 2014). Five men lost 
their lives in associated altercations. By August 2012, 3103 individuals appeared before the 
courts: 69% (2138) were found guilty, 16% (508) were acquitted, and 66% (1405) were sentenced 
to immediate custody with an average custodial sentence of 17.1 months (Ministry of Justice 
2012).   
 
Academic, journalistic, governmental and popular commentary on the English Riots has 
been prolific, and was beginning in earnest even as the embers of urban wreckage smouldered 
beneath the dust and debris of shattered windows and broken streets1. Though responses to the 
rioting developed along varied lines of empirical inquiry, they followed a well-rehearsed and 
recognisable post-riot script which filtered events through the lens of racism and the 
criminalisation of black youth (Jefferson 2012; Palmer 2012; Solomos 2011); deprivation, 
un(der)employment, and poverty (Jeffery and Jackson 2012); gang culture (Harding 2012); 
disproportionate and ineffective policing (Klein 2012; Waterton and Sesay 2012); social 
inequalities (Grover 2011; Till 2013); marginalisation, alienation, and social exclusion (Bridges 
2012; Calvacanti et al 2012; Creaney 2014); gender and “street masculinities” (Kelly and Gill 
2012); and their historical dis/continuity with the landmark urban riots of 1980/1 and 1985 which 
became “the commonest reference point for 2011” (Murji and Neal 2011: 2 – see also, Bateman 
2012; Lea and Hallsworth 2012; Pearson 2012). While such accounts offered a prompt rejoinder 
to the government’s reductive and moralising rhetoric2, analyses have been primarily read through 
the prism of the politics of inequality, exclusion, resistance and social justice, but ultimately lack 
the aetiological wherewithal to adequately and persuasively ground events within a collective 
politics of protest and grievance. Indeed, Gorringe and Rosie (2011) complained very early on that 
analyses overly drew from antediluvian “sociologies of the mob” and were poorly equipped to 
grapple with the political complexities of multi-sited, simultaneous riots. 
 
More tellingly, Winlow and Hall have argued that by clinging to an outmoded social 
democratic diagnosis of social unrest, analyses remain trapped by a “self-imposed epistemological 
regression” (2012a: 468), and unreceptive to alternative, less politically palatable readings. 
Indeed, Žižek (2011) had very quickly laid the ground for a postpolitical account of the riots in 
which the possibility of a properly political moment is foreclosed by an over-arching acquiescence 
to the consumerist logics of global capitalism and the rationalities of neoliberal rule. Thus, far from 
being a marker of resistance and radical activism, Žižek saw only “a zero-degree protest, a violent 
action demanding nothing” (2011: 2); while Bauman described the rioters as “defective and 
disqualified consumers” (2011: 1) who, though superficially appearing to be rebels with some kind 
of cause, were nonetheless acting out and conforming to an underlying free market, consumerist 
value system – see also Moxon (2011).  Across a series of theoretically nuanced and insightful 
articles, Winlow and Hall (2012a, 2012b  – see also, Treadwell et al 2013), delineate a 
postpolitical (Žižeckian) reading of events in which they reflect on the “objectless dissatisfaction” 
of the rioters which, in the absence of any discernible political manifesto, gave expression to a 
“culture of depressive hedonia, vapid consumerism, and deep cynicism set against a background 
of postpolitical torpor” (Winlow and Hall 2012a: 466). 
 
                                                          
1  See, especially, a range of Special Issues published in the immediate aftermath of the English Riots: Criminal Justice 
Matters 2012: 87; Safer Communities 2012: 11(1); Sociological Research Online 2011: 16(4). See also, 
Akram 2014.; Briggs, 2012; Lewis et al 2011.  
 
2  Notably, the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, regarded the riots as driven by “criminality pure and 
simple,” and energised by “people showing indifference to right and wrong… people with a twisted moral 
code… people with a complete absence of self-restraint.” See: Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech to 
the House of Commons, 11 August 2011: Text published in full in The Guardian, 11 August 2011. Available 
online at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/09/david-cameron-full-statement-uk-riots; and Prime 
Minister David Cameron’s speech at Witney, Oxfordshire, 15 August 2011. Available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-on-the-fightback-after-the-riots.   
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Though I am sympathetic to postpolitical accounts of the English Riots, and acknowledge 
their advancement over conventional narratives of social injustice and inequalities, they 
nonetheless do not move beyond the parameters of a very narrow and persistent formulation of 
what counts as political action in the context of riot. I make two key observations here. Firstly, it is 
not clear why the politics of riot should be so consistently filtered through the (putative) political 
subjectivities of those actively participating in riotous practices. Riot is a crowded and 
heterogeneous field of action where political engagements are predicated on a range of 
experiences and take multiple forms. Alternative subject positions are available – such as 
bystanders to the riots, business owners, police officers, motorists, residents, community 
representatives, reporters, film crews, photographers, television audiences and social media 
commentators – each of which is drawn into a differently configured, dynamic relationship with 
riotous subjects. In other words, the contours of the political space of riot, and the subjectivities 
which emerge through its eruptive energies are mapped across and captured within multiple and 
intersecting relationalities of witnessing and spectatorship, control and containment, victimisation 
and offending. Even so – and this is my second observation - while it is important to open up to 
scrutiny what we may mean by the “politics of riot,” and to critically explore the diversity of political 
subjectivities expressed through riotous engagements, there are prior questions to ask here - what 
counts as political agency; and who or what can and does act politically?  To date, political agency 
has been exclusively located in the human subject whose capacities for political action are, on the 
one hand, assumed to emerge from axes of identity co-ordinated by categories of class, ethnicity, 
gender, and age; or, on the other, are energised by the affective and cognitive charge of 
motivations, desires, fears, anxieties, ambitions, memories, solidarities and resistances. Can we 
theorise a politics of riot without/with only human actors? What would happen to our theories of 
the political event if we dispensed with anthropocentric positionalities – such as alienated youth, 
defective consumers, vulnerable victims, outraged citizen, passive spectator, moralistic politician 
– as the ground of political action? 
 
In their real-time, roaming documentary of the riots in Liverpool, Salford and Manchester, 
the film crew, Moosemasher, observe: “Quite a few people documenting this … he’s gotta a big 
camera …. he’s gotta a big camera … he’s gotta camera. This is going to be one of the most well-
filmed riots that’s ever been, like. Everyone’s on it today” (2011: at 36 minutes). Indeed, the 
pervasiveness of digital camera devices in our everyday lives, their infrastructural wherewithal and 
technological connectivities, render it harder (impossible) to deny the political participation of non-
human entities, but no less necessary to make it explicit through careful exposition. Beyond 
criminology, a number of scholars have started to address the agency of “digital things”, with 
critical analyses of smart photography (Kember 2014), wearable video technology (Duru 2018), 
police body cameras (Adams and Mastracci 2017; Wood 2017), plagiarism detection software 
(Introna 2011), and digital recording devices (Nordstrom 2015), all making an appearance in a 
dynamic and burgeoning field of research.  Each of these studies makes a significant contribution 
to the “new materialisms”3, advancing nuanced and theoretically innovative accounts of the co-
constitutive nature of human/nonhuman agency, the material-discursive nature of practice, and 
the proliferation of cyborgian identities - see also Barad 2007; Haraway 2008.  This paper 
contributes to and extends this important research in three key ways.  Firstly, the extant literature 
has tended to focus on questions of ontology, epistemology and methodology, with the effect of 
                                                          
3   The “new materialisms” does not signify a homogenous body of scholarship or a singular theoretical position.  Science 
and technology studies (Latour and Weibel 2005), feminist theory (Alaimo and Helman 2008), human geography (Braun 
and Whatmore 2010), sociology (Fox and Alldred 2016), and political philosophy (Connolly 2013), are all represented in 
a cross-disciplinary literature which, broadly, questions whether the material world can be adequately conceptualised in 
accounts which prioritise language, discourse and culture. For nuanced debates on the key concepts of new materialist 
thinking see: Special issues of Critical Inquiry 2001: 28(1); Cultural Studies<>Critical Methodologies 2016: 16(2); 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 2013: 41(3); and Theory Culture and Society 2002: 19(5/6); and 2005: 
22(1).  
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backgrounding the political implications of the agential entanglements of people and things4.  To 
address this lacuna, and secondly, the paper draws inspiration from Jane Bennett’s (2010) new 
materialist reworking of political theory, and her recognition of the active participation and 
distributive agency of nonhuman forces in the making of public events.  Thirdly, new materialism 
marks a new departure for criminology; though this kind of posthumanist thinking has sedimented 
within the academy, and across a broad spectrum of disciplinary fields, its presence is barely felt 
within criminological work.  This paper offers an access route for criminologists keen to unsettle 
and loosen the anthropocentric grip of modernist thought. 
 
In the next section, I map out the theoretical contours of new materialist thinking to make 
the case for reading the English Riots through the prism of the non-human – those “things” which 
are entangled and intertwined with human bodies and actions, but are invariably disregarded as 
politically active. I take particular note of Jane Bennett’s (2010) contribution to the field, unpacking 
her questioning of the binary thinking which separates culture from nature, and life from 
materiality; and delineating her problematisation of an ontological outlook which not only reduces 
matter to a state of passivity and inertia, but also regards it as lifeless, immutable, and dull. Coole 
and Frost suggest this is, in part, the logical outcome of a modernist philosophical project which 
regards “language, consciousness, subjectivity, agency, mind and soul; also imagination, 
emotions, values, meaning” (2010: 2) as the exclusive preserve of the human subject. As Bennett 
notes, this quarantining “of matter and life encourage(s) us to ignore the vitality of matter and the 
lively powers of material formations” (2010: vii, original emphasis). Yet, by paying attention to the 
vibrancy, movement and energies of “things,” and investing matter with an agency, capacity, and 
propensity to act politically, unfamiliar political landscapes come into view. Indeed, a renewed 
focus on materialities not only offers an alternative “ontological diagnosis of contemporary political 
life” (Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2015: 4), but also, as Coole notes, amounts to a “political-
ethical intervention … and a reckoning of the material circuits, flows and experiences that mark 
the 21st century” (2013: 452-453).   
 
In what follows, I bring conceptual form and substantive content to the strange terrain of 
“vital materiality” and delineate its constitutive role within what Bennett refers to as a “political 
ecology of things”5. The paper begins to trace such an ecology through the prism of the witnessing 
energies of digital camera devices, noting how they generate, invent, disrupt and enact relations 
of power which have significant political effects.  
 
 
Vibrant matter 
Displacing the human subject from the centre-ground of the political is not the same as 
dispensing with her altogether. It is people, after all, who riot, hurl bricks, set buses alight, ransack 
                                                          
4  In many ways, this is the outcome of a scholarship which privileges Karen Barad’s collective writings on 
agential realism (1999, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014).  For some, Barad is considered to be “one 
of the most influential and important representatives of contemporary materialist scholarship” (Lemke 
2015: 5 – see also, Hollin et al 2017).  Yet, Barad’s contribution centres on the onto-epistemological unity 
of nature/culture, being/knowing, and meaning/matter, with the effect that she pays far less attention to 
the politics of entangled agencies.  
 
5   Bennett is one of a number of theorists who have developed politically-inflected theoretical frameworks 
which acknowledge the political agency of the non-human: see, for example, theses on “political matter” 
(Braun and Whatmore 2010); “cosmopolitics” (Stengers 2011); the “natural contract” (Serres 1995); the 
“politics of nature” (Latour 2004); and the “fragility of things” (Connolly 2013).  See also research papers on 
the “politics of housing” and “mediant assemblage theory” (Appadurai 2015), and the “politics of affective 
infrastructures” (Knox 2017). As Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams note: “What binds this diverse literature 
together is a common attempt to thematise the concept of materiality, its relationship with politics, and how 
an emphasis on material factors might lead to a refashioning of our understanding of the concept of `the 
political’” (2015: 4). 
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shops, build barricades, smash windows, throw bottles, kick down doors and experience the 
embodied and visceral effects of these activities. Yet, as Woodward et al (2012) point out, we 
cannot assume that animated, enlivened bodies constitute everything which exists in the situation. 
Indeed, they talk of an “unnameable event”, an “unexpected something else,” an extra- or a-
subjective excess which leaves “even direct participants ….. scratching their heads and fumbling 
to make sense of this messy reality” (Woodward et al 2012: 209, original emphasis). For Bennett 
(2010: 1-19), this “something else” is “thing-power” which she figures as “a not quite human force 
that addle(s) and alter(s) human and other bodies … an irreducibly strange dimension of matter, 
an out-side” (2010: 2-3, original emphasis). In her exposition of the force of things, Bennett reflects 
on and critically interrogates the multiplicity of concepts which have sought to name this power – 
Spinoza’s conatus, Thoreau’s wild, de Vries’s absolute, Adorno’s non-identity, and Foucault’s 
unthought6 -  to garner a theorization of materiality which endows it with efficacy, energy, intensity 
and vibrancy, and grants it a vital impetus which “can do things, has sufficient coherence to make 
a difference, produce effects, alter the course of events” (2010: viii, original emphasis).  Raging 
fires, splintering glass, dogs straining on leashes, the twisted metal of wrecked shutters, the soft 
textures and foldability of looted clothing, and the bulkiness of widescreen televisions “offer 
themselves to the subject as action” (Merleau-Ponty 1981: 106).  In other words, materialities are 
not inert, passive or stable entities; though we might stop short of investing things with human will, 
intentionality, reason and desire, they do have agentic capacity7. As Bennett puts it, “so-called 
inanimate things have a life …….. an inexplicable vitality of energy, a moment of independence 
from and resistance to us and other bodies: a kind of thing-power” (2010: 18).    
 
Latour (2004: 237) uses the term “actant” to denote any entity which has a capacity to 
act; it is a relational rather than a foundational agency, which cannot be specified in advance and 
is traceable only in its performance – as Latour puts it, “(n)o one knows what an environment can 
do” (2004: 80). Barad (2007) refers to the “intra-action” of human and nonhuman entities as the 
ontological dynamic of social and political practice; while Nancy (2000) talks of a “co-existential 
analytic” wherein action is mutually constituted in surfaces of contact where the boundaries 
between life and matter dissolve – when fire burns flesh, and knives pierce skin, or when fibre 
optics transmit a message. Relational understandings of intra-active, co-existential actants 
underscore Bennett’s notion of distributed agency which, she argues, “always depends on 
collaboration, cooperation, or (the) interactive interference of many bodies and forces” (2010: 21). 
Thing-power is, then, a congregational force which assembles a confederation of material and 
immaterial entities, it connects people and things, biologies and technologies, and creates the 
conditions for joint enterprise in moments of political transformation.  
 
Riot manifests one such transformation, and constitutes a specific assemblage of human 
and nonhuman actants, a hybrid co-articulation of bodies and matter; though forming temporary 
alignments and contingent clusters of alliances, which may stabilise and territorialise as a coherent 
entity, assemblages nonetheless remain a fluid and volatile affiliation (DeLanda 2002, 2006; 
Deleuze and Guattari 1987). As Bennett notes, “because each member-actant maintains an 
energetic pulse slightly `off’ from that exuded by the assemblage, such assemblages are never 
                                                          
6   See: Adorno, Theodor. 1973. Negative Dialectics. Translated by E.B. Ashton. New York: Continuum; 
Thoreau, Henry D. 1973. The Writings of Henry David Thoreau: Walden, ed J. Lyndon Shanley. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press; Spinoza, Baruch. 1992. Ethics: Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and 
Selected Letters, ed Seymour Feldman. Translated by Samuel Shirley. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett; de Vries, 
Hent. 2006. Introduction: before, around, and beyond the theologico-political. In Political Theologies: Public 
Religions in a Post-Secular World, eds Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan, 1-88. New York: Fordham 
University Press; Foucault, Michel. 1973. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. New 
York: Vintage/Random Press.  
 
7  For a fuller account of the philosophical and ontological complexities of conceptualising the nature and 
locus of agency across human/non-human assemblages - in terms of intentionality, causality, 
intersubjectivity, and affect - see Bennett 2010: Chapter 2. 
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fixed blocks but open-ended wholes” (2005: 447). The English Riots names a collectivity (a 
coalition) of heterogeneous assemblages, each alive with movement and energies – from the hot-
bloodedness of the mob, to the choking fumes of burning cars, and the visualising power of mobile 
digital camera technologies - which have both a distributive and a compositional force.   
 
Things do their thing with or without us. We are both outnumbered and constituted by them, 
and thing-power effects change in any given state of affairs. There is no good reason, then, not to 
pay greater attention to the vibrant materialities which embroil us and shape us.  Indeed, Bennett 
challenges us to consider “how analyses of political events might change if we gave the force of 
things more due” (2010: viii). In the remainder of this paper, I respond to this challenge by critically 
mapping the thing-power of digital camera technologies, a particular material configuration which 
assembles an ecology of political practices predicated on witnessing, surveillance, investigation, 
vigilance, and the visual archive.   
 
 
A material politics of witnessing 
If thing-power figured at all within academic commentary of the riots, it did so in relation to 
the use of smartphones and social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Blackberry 
Messenger (BBM) and You Tube. Baker (2011, 2012), for example, took account of how the use 
of mobile phones and the “real-time” modes of mediated exchange which this technology 
facilitates, altered the spatio-temporal dynamics of the riots. Introducing the notion of the 
“mediated crowd,” Baker writes of a virtual arena of affective energy, which not only fuelled the 
speed of communication about events on the ground, but also recalibrated the geographical scale 
of riotous interactions. At the same time, research undertaken by the London School of Economics 
(LSE), in collaboration with The Guardian, claimed that the widespread availability of social media 
and mobile phone technology gave these riots a uniqueness which “distinguished them from 
previous civil disturbances” (Lewis et al 2011: 30), noting that messaging (via BBM) was a key tool 
for the secure and efficient sharing of information about, for example, where the riots were 
happening, safe exit routes, and details of police operations and logistics (Lewis et al 2011: 30-
33). While Baker’s and the LSE/Guardian’s focus on mobile phones is very welcome, analyses 
have foregrounded the singular device of the smartphone, which not only backgrounds other, 
equally prevalent digital technologies – such as the digital camera, camcorder, and CCTV - but also 
prioritises the textual and discursive, over the visual and acoustic usages of these devices. These 
studies also restrict the scope of political engagement to that of rioting, omitting any reference to 
the policing, televising or witnessing of events which were similarly predicated on the mobilisation 
of a range of digital devices8. More importantly, these accounts pay no attention to the material 
power of “digital things”  but, rather, treat them as (mere) tools which, in the hands of inventive 
and skillful humans, are used to reconfigure the spatio-temporal parameters of interaction but are 
accorded no active agency of their own. Once rendered as passive and inert, the vibrant 
materialities of these digital devices can be conveniently airbrushed out of the action, and their 
efficacy as participating political actants can be denied.  As Bennet notes, we are thus presented 
with “the image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized matter (which) feeds human hubris and 
our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and consumption” (2010: ix). The task, then, is to 
present an alternative imaginary in which the vitality of digital camera technologies is 
foregrounded. As a first step in this endeavour, I map out the contours of “digital thing-power”, 
moving on to critically explore the triadic figuration of the citizen-camera-witness. This provides 
some ground to delineate (tentatively) a political ecology of digital things. 
 
Digital thing-power 
So, what counts as “materiality” when it comes to digital camera technologies, and what is 
meant by their thing-power?   I address each issue in turn. There is certainly little controversy in 
                                                          
8  There is no evidence (public record) of their deployment during the English Riots, but it is highly likely that drones, 
satellites, body cameras, and helicopter surveillance technologies were also used to assist police operations on the 
ground.  
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acknowledging the “forensic materiality” (Kirschenbaum 2008) of digital devices; that is, their 
physical substrates such as liquid crystal display screens (LCDs), micro-drives, connectors, circuit 
boards, card readers, (semi-)conductors, light sensors, transistors, batteries, speakers, 
microphones, and silicone chips constitute the generic stuff of digital hardware. Equally, it does 
not require a huge leap of faith to recognise the materiality of the infrastructural architecture of 
digital networks such as servers, cables, fiber optics, routers, modems, and hubs, for example. 
Though less visible, we can also appreciate the atomic and electro-magnetic form of more volatile 
matter such as electrical charges, radio signals, pixels, bits, photons and memory – all of which 
have material properties of “mutability, persistence, robustness, spatiality, size, durability, 
flexibility, and mobility” (Dourish and Mazmanian 2011: 4). However, to talk of the materiality of 
software, or code, is a much more equivocal proposition. Chun, for example, talks of the “curious 
separation of software from hardware” (2004: 27), and argues that this false dichotomy functions 
ideologically to perpetuate and obfuscate the anthropocentric conceit that software “acts” only 
through the work and effort of human programmers and users. It does so, she points out, by 
“conflating executable with execution, program with process, order with action” (2004: 27). Kittler 
is more forthright and declarative with his bold assertion that “there is no software,” and that it is 
merely a human-friendly term which “does not exist as a machine-independent faculty” (1995: 3). 
Rather, it is “a thing in a process of revealing itself, which moves through materials in the form of 
computation algorithms that one can label `discursive’” (Rachev 2014: 3). Software is, then, 
always-already becoming in and through the operational minutiae of hardware – logic gates, 
silicone interfaces, switching components, microtransistor cells, electronic diffusers, and so on – 
such that “microscopically written inscriptions …. are able to read and write by themselves” (Kittler 
1995: 1).  In her “woman’s account” of programming on the Univac I, Koss regards the 
development of automatic programming as a democratising moment; here she reflects on its 
impact on the gendered division of labour in the computer industry: 
 
These developments were all in the line of enhancing the basic capability of the machine and making 
it easier to use. Without these higher-level languages and processes such as assemblers, compilers, 
and generators, which democratized problem solving with the computer, I believe programming 
would have remained in the hands of a relatively small number of technically oriented software 
writers using machine code, who would have been essentially the high priests of computing (2003: 
58). 
 
Yet, whatever its merits for workplace gender politics, the autonomous agency of code also 
signals its performative capacity - that is, “its apparent ability to ` make things happen’” (Mackenzie 
and Vurdubakis 2011: 6). For Mackenzie (2005), code is more than the language of machines; 
rather it is a “culture-object” which enacts new configurations of socio-cultural categories, values, 
and norms, recalibrates what can be known and is know-able, and reinvents modes of semiotic 
exchange – see also, Chun (2008); Galloway (2006); and Theory, Culture and Society, Special 
Issue on Codes and Codings in Crisis, (2011: 28[6]). Code, then, is performative in the sense that 
in processes of circulation, and at the intersections of program protocols and transactional 
interfaces – such as bridges, firewalls and switches - it rewrites instructions through the successive 
recoding, decoding and transcoding of differentially encoded commands. As Mackenzie and 
Vurdubakis note, “(t)his performativity of code constantly enhances and widens the possibility of 
variations and deviations that are difficult to contain or control” (2011: 7).  
 
This brief inventory of the materiality of digital devices, suggests that their status as (mere) 
“tools” or “media” does not even begin to capture their multiple capacities to act, intervene and 
participate in (ostensibly) human-led events. So, more than acting to facilitate interaction and 
communication, “digital things” like smartphones, cameras and camcorders, and the 
heterogeneity of their constitutive material elements, generate, invent, disrupt, and enact relations 
of power which have significant political effects – that is, they exercise thing-power.  
 
Citizen-subjects and camera-things 
The political enterprise of the non-human is perfectly captured by, and delineated through 
the emergence and proliferation of citizen journalism – sometimes referred to as “digital activism,” 
Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Criminology   Witnessing Riot 
February 2019, 11:18-37  Campbell 
25 
 
“mobile witnessing,” or “media-witnessing” - which has redefined and transformed the politics of 
witnessing (Andén-Papadopoulos 2013; Reading 2009). Indeed, Andén-Papadopoulos talks of 
“the new powerful figure of …… the citizen-camera-witness” (2013: 754, original emphasis), and 
positions this hybrid actor at the centre of shifting political dynamics. For all this, she only gives 
prominence to the agency of the citizen-subject in this triadic figuration, and pays little attention to 
a politically active and engaged “camera-thing”.  For example, within a broad spectrum of actions 
which constitute “practices of witnessing”, Andén-Papadopoulos notes that digital camera 
technologies enact “the swift translation of private sensory experience into public mediated 
testimony that can be infinitely reproduced and shared worldwide via wireless communication 
networks” (2013: 757).  This somewhat understates the case. That is to say, she does not go on 
to elaborate or unpack the pivotal work of translation; yet, it is within such labour that the 
complexity of the camera-thing’s agential capacity is to be found - what processes and actions does 
translation actually entail; what does the conversion of “private sensory experience” involve; and, 
if camera-things are integral to practices of witnessing, then beyond their mediation of public 
testimonies, we need to ask how they co-produce them? How, precisely, can we track and trace 
the vibrancy, intra-activity and productive power of “digital matter” as it enters into, assembles and 
becomes bound up with the politics of witnessing?  
 
The visual record of the English Riots is vast, and is widely circulated across both time and 
space. Some seven years after the events of August 2011, using the search term, “English Riots 
2011,” a cursory sweep of new media platforms identifies 294,000 camera-generated uploads to 
You Tube, including amateur video, broadcast film, photography, and multi-media footage; the 
photo-sharing site, Flickr, indicates an inventory of 9,714 still images; Google Video hosts 750,000 
filmic uploads, and Wikimedia Commons lists 839 multimedia files9. The point here is not to claim 
a precise count of discrete (or even relevant) visual entries – indeed, some of this imagery is either 
duplicated, or it is “riots-related” rather than contemporaneously filmed/photographed material. 
Rather, it is to recognise that across this vast digital repository of found visual data only a handful 
of still and moving images have become emblematic of this complex, fast-moving, multi-sited 
series of riotous events. We might include here, for example, the image of the double-decker 
London bus set ablaze in Tottenham High Road; the silhouetted figure of Monika Konczyk leaping 
from her burning first-floor flat in Croydon; and the Carpet Right Building, consumed by such a 
fierce conflagration that it lit up the night sky of south east London.  Shot through a professional 
aesthetic, such imagery (arguably) carries a visceral, affective, and embodied charge; that is to 
say, in its conversion of “private sensory experience”, the camera-thing captures within its frame 
the theatricality of a Barthesian punctum which provokes, in equal measure, our outrage, empathy, 
despair and incredulity.  In short, in collaboration with the human image-maker, the camera’s 
micro-technologies (zoom, focus, shutter, flash, aperture, crop, pan, tilt etc) can work to move us 
from a position of passive spectatorship to active witnessing which demands an ethico-political 
response (Boltanski et al 1999; Chouliaraki 2008).   
 
However, beyond this small fraction of especially poignant, evocative imagery, the 
iconography of the English Riots is better described as visually nondescript and unremarkable.  In 
Barthesian terms: “these images (have) no punctum … I glance through them, I don’t recall them; 
no detail (in some corner) ever interrupts my reading” (Barthes 1981: 41). They form a studium, a 
visual bricolage inflected with a blasé aesthetic where practices of witnessing seem disarticulated 
from an unfolding narrative and devoid of the interpretative, editorial input of a film-
maker/photographer. For these images, it seems as though the task of translation (of the “private 
sensory experience” of riot) has not only been delegated to camera-things, but also involves a far 
more mechanical and automated mode of witnessing where looking and listening is replaced by 
recording and monitoring.   
 
                                                          
9   These figures were generated by a search undertaken on 14 May 2018.   
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Studium imagery may not engage us on an emotional level, but this does not mean that it 
depoliticises practices of witnessing. Indeed, through the prism of the mundane a wider range of 
political options come into view. Hand-held, digital camera technologies captured the energy and 
movement of the English Riots in a slideshow of discontinuous, fragmented, still/moving, and 
distributed images. Shot from multiple angles and locational standpoints, these images are of 
nothing in particular, and everything in general; of groups of agitated (usually) young people moving 
into, out of, through, and away from shops; of fire-setting, bottle-throwing, assaults, and 
ransacking; of burning/burnt out vehicles; of people making-off with looted goods; of police 
cordons, advances and retreats; and of rioters poised in stand-offs, or rushing toward/running 
away from the centre of the action. This is complemented by the visual capture of privately and 
publicly operated CCTV surveillance technologies.  Productive of imagery which is grainy, partial, 
and sometimes blurred, these camera-things generate continuous, fixed point, time-stamped, 
visual data which, by virtue of their pre-defined focal scope, grant proximity to the action and a 
relatively close-up view of everything which passes through their visual orbits.   
 
Importantly, these practices of witnessing are emplaced within broader networks of digital 
transactions and conversions. That is to say, camera-things double as sensors (Andrejevic and 
Burdon 2014); as detailed above, their vibrant materialities – transducers, semi-conductors, 
silicone chips, micro-drives etc - act to translate “private sensory experience” not merely into a 
visual record, but also into readable signals, encoded protocols and processable outputs (Kalanter-
Zadeh and Wlodarski 2013: 12-22). Moreover, embedded within an environment of infrastructural 
actants - a Global Positioning System (GPS), WiFi, the Worldwide Web, and hundreds of millions of 
Uniform Resource Locators (URLs), for example - digital camera technologies bear witness in and 
through fluid and traceable trajectories of interconnectivity, interoperability and intra-activity. A 
different kind of testimony is made possible, one that is animated by an electronic rather than an 
emotional charge, and which entails the comprehensive capture and transmission of data trails 
which can be systematically mined, filtered, sorted, retrieved, and triangulated to generate 
actionable intelligence and shareable evidence. The camera-witness is, then, not only a key actor 
within a confederation of witnessing circuits, but it also produces specific political effects. For 
Bennett (2010: Chapter 7), such effects initiate a Rancièrian (2009) disruption which unsettles 
received wisdoms of who, and importantly, what can act politically. Moreover, she reminds us that 
things act “in a field already crowded with other endeavours and their consequences, a crowd with 
which the new entrant immediately interacts, overlaps, interferes” (2010: 101). In the aftermath 
of the English Riots, practices of witnessing were harnessed to, and co-opted into police 
investigative work - a specific political ecology within which the non-human force of digital camera 
technologies stages a series of political interventions. I want to unpack this claim by first making a 
number of empirical observations.  
 
A political ecology of digital things 
By the 9 August 2011, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS [the Met]) had launched 
Operation Withern, posting several hundreds of CCTV stills on the MPS website, as well as creating 
a dedicated Flickr account which attracted 7.8 million hits in its first 10 days (Metropolitan Police 
Service 2011).  A day later, Merseyside Police and Greater Manchester Police (GMP) pursued 
similar strategies, with the Assistant Chief Constable of GMP, Garry Shewan, warning: “we have 
your image, we have your face, we have your acts of wanton criminality on film” (Meikle and Jones 
2011). At the same time, community-spirited citizen-witnesses were enthusiastically uploading 
footage from the riots onto You Tube; while those who merely wanted to publicise that “they were 
there” were posting imagery and films across numerous social media platforms. By the end of the 
first day of riots, a Facebook community with 500 members, featured an accumulating collection 
of photos and videos complete with captions; and on 7 August 2011, an anonymous Tumblr 
blogger launched a “Catch a Looter” campaign, extending witness opportunities to an expansive 
and exponentially proliferating population of “offender identifiers”. Curating thousands of stills and 
close-ups of rioters in action, the campaign message was simple – “if you recognise anyone, 
contact Crimestoppers on 0800 555 111” (Popkins 2012). By February 2012, the Met had viewed 
over 75% of an estimated 200,000 hours of footage taken from both CCTV and mobile devices; 
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they had prepared over 5,000 packages of evidence, trawling through the detailed minutiae of the 
visual data to trace, track and triangulate offenders’ criss-crossing movements through the 
time/space of the riots; and through this painstaking work, 1100 criminal identifications, 
sufficiently robust for initiating judicial proceedings, were confirmed (Metropolitan Police Service 
2012b: 126-129). These several descriptive points mark the intersection(s) of practices of 
witnessing and police-public investigative effort. However, it is what they betoken of the exercise 
of thing-power within a field of political possibilities, which is of more critical interest.  I explore 
three key problematics – the problem of digital excess; the matter of epistemological authority; 
and the diffusion of political responsibility.  
 
Despite a veneer of success – and I will return to this below - police forces in impacted 
areas of the country were overwhelmed by the hyper-abundance of visual evidence. Its diffusion 
through multiple circuits, and its distribution by and across variegated publics rendered the visual 
material “ungraspable” (Marres 2005: 216); as Weinberger puts it, digitally-generated forms of 
knowledge may simply be “too big to know” (2011: 1). Here we are reminded of thing-power’s 
“excess” and “unnameability”, its “something else” which leaves everyone confounded. This is not 
merely a matter of volume, or of being outnumbered and outstripped by the productivity of digital 
things, but of being bereft of the means to respond effectively to their multi-sited, witnessing and 
visualizing power. Quite simply, policing authorities lacked the material and human capacity to fully 
inter- and intra-act with the vibrant energies of machinic and digital matter. Apart from the 
dedicated work of the few boroughs where Visual Images Identifications and Detection Offices 
(VIIDOs) had been established prior to the summer disorders10, the paucity of specialist hardware, 
viewing facilities, and compatible software left the Met with “no technical solution other than the 
manual cutting and pasting of images into posters” (Metropolitan Police Service 2012b: 128). Even 
if the requisite IT equipment was in plentiful supply, the numbers of police personnel skilled and 
trained in the use of digital visual identification techniques was exposed as wholly inadequate 
(Metropolitan Police Service 2012b). So, without intention, will, calculation or desire, digital things 
raise difficult questions concerning the efficiency of policing’s investigative practices, and 
especially its capacity to manage and process widely available evidential materials in ways which 
retain the procedural integrity of the process (Home Office 2007). In so doing, thing-power 
catalyses a new, fiercely argued politics around the development of “digital imagery strategies” 
and all this entails in terms of costs, technological investments, staffing, organizational co-
ordination, procedural protocols, training, and the deployment of expertise (Association of Chief 
Police Officers 2012; Home Office 2015; Metropolitan Police Service 2012b; National Policing 
Improvement Agency 2007).  
 
All this said, investigative work using visual identification techniques did yield appreciable 
numbers of successful prosecutions, and by August 2012, 3103 individuals had appeared in 
English and Welsh courts, resulting in 2138 findings of guilt, and 508 acquittals (Ministry of Justice 
2012: 3). Some of the more serious and complex cases were very loudly trumpeted - most notably, 
the cases against Junior Saunders, who played a leading role in the Hackney riots (Metropolitan 
Police Service 2012b; Owen, 2011), the “scooter looter”, Ryan Kichenside (Huffington Post 2011), 
and Gordon Thompson, the House of Reeves arsonist (BBC News 2012). However, much of this 
success relied on the triangulation of digital visual evidence with other evidential actors, such as 
clothing fibres, DNA, blood, saliva, hair, fingerprints and, importantly, human “recognisers” 
(Metropolitan Police Service 2012b: 126). Here it is worth remembering that digital camera-things 
have a propensity to spontaneously generate various modes of “image noise” – such as Gaussian, 
salt-and-pepper, speckle, poisson, photon, quantization, dark current, and anisotropic noise 
(Gonzalez and Woods 2008) – which produce fluctuations, deviations and distortions in their visual 
output. Quite autonomously, then, digital devices can act randomly and unaccountably to degrade 
                                                          
10   A VIIDO unit had been established at Southwark Police Station in 2006, largely through the efforts and 
moral entrepreneurship of one detective chief inspector, Michael Neville.  Its early success encouraged a 
greater use of such units which, by August 2011, had been established in eleven other London boroughs 
(Evison 2015). 
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the readability and quality of their own imagery. Put another way, the evidential power of digital 
camera-things lacks sufficiency and admissibility unless it is brought into coalition with forensic 
and human actants. As Evison notes:  
 
CCTV image identification relies on eyewitness recognition – rather than forensic analysis.  DNA 
profiling evidence is evidence of fact supported within a comprehensive experimental and 
theoretical scientific paradigm. Dermatoglyphic fingerprinting evidence is based on rigorous 
empirical comparison between marks …. In the VIIDO process, identifications are made by facial 
recognition. They are evidence of opinion supported neither by empirical comparison nor empirical 
science (2015: 527). 
 
Evison is drawing our attention to a politics of authority in which science and probability theory 
grant epistemological credibility to the evidential agency of some things (DNA and fingerprints), but 
not others (digital imagery). Put another way, the prolific and endless circulations of digital imagery 
(as a distributed body of visual evidence) enter the crowded jurisprudential terrain of due process 
with a deficit of authority to “know” and give evidence on its own behalf.  This latter (still) remains 
dependent on the subjective, interpretative work of human eyewitnesses or “recognizers”, typically 
police officers or members of the public who claim to recognize the face, clothing or other attributes 
of depicted individuals. Moreover, eyewitness identification is acknowledged and understood by 
judicial and legal professionals, human rights groups, and academics, to be a particularly 
problematic form of evidence which compromises core principles of justice (Edmond et al 2009)11. 
Given the sheer volume of cases which overly relied on visual identification techniques, and the 
widespread and ongoing skepticism of their efficacy in due process terms (Bruce and Young 2012), 
it is little wonder that their unbridled use should provoke a contentious, critical politics which goes 
to the heart of doctrinal law on the rules of evidence and the universal right to a fair trial. As Latour 
might put it, digitally-generated circuits of imagery articulate a politically disruptive “proposition” 
which “induces perplexity in those who are gathered to discuss it … those whose habits it is going 
to modify” (2004: 123). 
 
However, matters do not rest there.  Under the broad banner of “citizen journalism”, the 
proliferation of “citizen-camera-witnessing” has been regarded positively (Frosh and Pinchevski 
2009; Reading 2009; Tait 2011), and as nurturing a democratic and inclusive public sphere with 
the potential to “stare down the state” (Wall and Linnemann 2014). But it is the more pejorative 
terminology of “digital vigilantism” (Author XXXX), “web sleuthing” (Yardley et al 2018), 
“crowdsourcing for justice” (Nhan et al 2017) or “cyber-vigilantism” (Smallridge et al 2016) which 
not only signals a far more pernicious and problematic politics, but also troubles wider political 
ecologies of accountable, consensual, and legitimate modes of witnessing and investigation. 
Moreover, such terms signify how networked spaces engender a dispersed and pluralized 
investigative assemblage, where the power to witness is not only diffused across multiple sites, 
both real and virtual, but is generated through the joint enterprise of digital and human actors. To 
paraphrase Foucault, witnessing/investigative/surveillant effort is now fragmented across 
hundreds of thousands of “tiny theatres of (vigilance)” (Foucault 1977: 113), most of which lack 
any legal and moral authority to operate in this way.  Denounced as procedurally unsafe; as opening 
and extending the investigative terrain, rather than closing and solving cases; as bringing the 
criminal justice process and policing into disrepute; and as harmful to both victims and suspects 
(Nhan et al 2017), “digital vigilantism” has been widely discredited as a twenty-first century version 
of “true crime infotainment” (Yardley et al 2018), and as a form of “weaponized visibility” (Trottier 
2017). These are well-rehearsed debates which I will not dwell on here; suffice to say that there 
                                                          
11   Consider, for example, the case of Dane Williamson: charged with the arson of the Miss Selfridge store 
in Manchester, Williamson was remanded in custody at HMP Forest Bank, but released after nine days with 
all charges “sensationally dropped” (Keeling 2011). Described as” wearing similar clothes to the arsonist, 
but slightly different” (Carter 2011), Williamson was mis-identified from CCTV footage by a police identifier 
which his solicitor denounced as a blatant form of “instant justice” (Carter 2011). Matters were made worse 
by Facebook groups who not only circulated Williamson’s image, and identity, but also subjected him to 
abuse and incited the burning down of his home whilst on remand (Carter 2011; Keeling 2011).   
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has been no recognition hitherto of the complicity of human and non-human agencies which co-
produce and enact these investigative efforts.   Mirroring Andén-Papadopoulos’s excision of a 
politically complicit “camera-thing,” Yardley et al talk of digital-things in very instrumental and 
utilitarian terms, and present them as a passive, environmental infrastructure which facilitates 
and, in their words, “hypermediates” networked interactions, enhancing “opportunities not only for 
people to consume cases but to participate in collective investigations and create their own 
representations” (2018: 85, original emphasis).   
 
Theatres of vigilance are, then, figured as wholly embodied and dematerialized spaces, where 
people rather than things take centre stage as the progenitors of witnessing energies.  
Disentangled from digital matter, this kind of anthropocentric bias glosses over the material 
dynamics of witnessing and loses sight not only of the conjoint actions of corporeal-affective-
cognitive and machinic-electronic-digital entities, but also the complex and diverse ways these 
entities intra-act to produce specific witnessing practices.  
 
 
Conclusion: towards an immersive prospectus 
A new materialist account of witnessing does not amount to a one-sided celebration of the 
productive agency of digital camera devices – and the concomitant displacement of human efforts 
– so much as an acknowledgement of the breadth and diversity of agencies which can and do act 
politically. I have traced some of this diversity through a delineation of the nature and scope of 
differently configured witnessing entities. So, for example, in contrast to the human witness, 
camera-things are not called upon to revisit personal trauma, or to recount, reflect on, write and/or 
speak of their sensory, affective or corporeal experiences of significant events. Digital devices bear 
witness without the benefit of cognitive, interpretative or embodied insight; rather, their capacities 
to act are energised through the forensic materialities of machinic bodies, the volatility of electronic 
matter, and the autogenesis of code. As such, a different kind of witnessing agency comes into 
play, one which works in an automated and mechanistic way to convert pixels into images, 
electrical signals into readable output, and random access memory into visual record. Moreover, 
camera-things mobilise multiple agencies which cut across and through fluid and transactional 
trajectories of a myriad of intra-active, interconnected, motile actants, collectively assembling the 
capture, storage, retrieval, transmission and triangulation of data. This has implications to the 
forms of witnessing knowledge in circulation, and how they may be engaged with. So, where film-
makers/photographers lay claim to a visual testimony predicated on an emotionally-compelling 
and selective iconography of symbolic imagery, camera-things generate a highly granular bricolage 
of heterogeneous, discontinuous and fragmented visual elements. While the former can be 
intersubjectively viewed or made narratively meaningful, the latter compels a search for the 
idiosynchratic devil in the microscopic detail, and relies on a range of algorithmic protocols capable 
of mining, mapping, ordering, filtering, and scanning a vast visual repository. Taking (comparative) 
stock of the diversity of witnessing agencies at work here underlines the pivotal notion of 
witnessing as a thoroughly distributed and co-productive practice to the point that the assumed 
distinction between politically active witnessing subjects and inert camera-things, is permanently 
ruptured.   
 
When witnessing is pressed into the service of post-riot, police investigative work, a specific 
ecology of confederated political agencies comes into view, and a heterogeneity of political actors 
– from a CCTV monitor to a bystanding member of the public, from anisotropic noise to a television 
film crew - jostle, collide, inter-/intra-act, and compete to intervene across the congested political 
space(s) of witnessing practices. Though this paper offers only a very preliminary sketch of these 
interventions, three salient features of their political effects come into view. Firstly, the (over-
)abundance of digital camera devices engenders an excess of visual data which catches 
investigative actors unaware, and puts policing strategists on the back foot as they scramble to 
close the gap between operational capacity and intelligence overload. Secondly, even when 
policing actors gain traction over the prolific witnessing agencies of digital materialities, this, it 
turns out, is only with the help of other non-human (forensic) actants who shore up the 
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epistemological deficits of visual evidence. Indeed, the tendency for digital matter to autonomously 
and spontaneously distort its own authority “to know”, is made more complex by its capacities to 
do its own thing and propagate new “knowledge objects,” to adapt Mackenzie’s (2005) phrase. To 
be sure, it is human actors who are motivated to search for information, upload imagery and 
videos, comment upon and debate cases, identify suspects, engage with policing authorities, and 
attempt to fashion a law enforcement role. However, and thirdly, they do so in collaboration with a 
myriad of other “things” such as self-calibrating algorithms which sort, filter and hierarchise 
continuous flows of visual data; protocols which internalize and naturalize social prejudices and 
political distortions; multiple platforms which generate different kinds of analytics (of user profiles, 
viewing frequencies, data-shares, followers, geographical locations, and timelines); visualizing 
tools which alter the pixelation of images, and transform not only how they are displayed, framed, 
streamed and viewed, but also how they are profiled, organized, prioritized, shared and known. In 
so far as this shapes and informs what is regarded as urgent, important, significant, or even 
relevant to an investigative gaze, this sets the agenda for how witnessing practice across a myriad 
of engaged publics may be performed. 
 
Ruppert et al remind us that digital devices are materially implicated in the making of 
worlds and “the creation of new knowledge spaces” (2013: 34). Witnessing is one such knowledge 
space where the productive and performative energies of a hybrid collective of people and things 
reconfigure the methodologies, agencies, apparatuses and practices of investigative labour, but in 
ways which may trouble liberal-democratic models of policing. That is to say, if we acknowledge 
(accept) that witnessing agencies are distributed across a heterogeneous assemblage of inter-
/intra-acting human and non-human actors, then it is difficult to isolate a singular locus of agency 
and, by extension, attribute responsibilities for politico-ethical interventions which may have 
harmful or negative effects. Loss of memory, selective recall, embellishment, deliberate omission, 
bias and prejudice can compromise the integrity of such interventions; in each case, however, the 
burden of responsibility, and the source of perceived failings and injustices, is conventionally laid 
at the feet of human actors. In a political arena where witnessing is performed through energetic 
assemblages of interconnected agencies, human exceptionalism becomes untenable, and cannot 
be disentangled from a field alive with cross-cutting vital forces. There is no claim that digital 
camera devices act with intention, desire, affective impulse, instinct or rationality, but they do 
participate in and contribute to witnessing practices, and thereby induce an array of transformative 
political effects for which “we humans” are not entirely responsible. As Barad notes, the 
entanglements of matter and meaning, and the co-constitutive agencies of nonhuman/human 
actors are “irreducible relations of responsibility …. there is no fixed dividing line between `self’ 
and `other’” (2010: 265). Indeed, Barad’s call for an ethics of “response-ability .. (in which) each 
of `us’ is constituted as responsible for the other, as the other” (2012: 215, original emphasis), 
prompts a re-imagination of our research and political agendas.  That is, when normative politico-
ethical imaginaries of justice, fairness, transparency and accountability are at stake, perhaps a 
more immersive prospectus is called for, one which seeks out the co-articulation of bodies and 
matter, and cultivates a politics of alertness and responsiveness to the assemblages in which we 
are enmeshed.  
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